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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 6201

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: WORKING GROUP STUDY OF SUB-CEILING ARRANGMENTS
AND FLEXIBILITY

REF: USNATO 6048 DTG 061815Z NOV 75

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE REVISED DRAFT OF MBFR WORKING GROUP STUDY OF LIMITED FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES FOR US AND USSR FORCES (REFTEL) BASED ON WG DISCUSSION ON NOVEMBER 11. MOST CHANGES IN TEXT WERE EDITORIAL IN NATURE.

2. BELGIAN REP (BURNY) OBJECTED TO PARA 10 OF REFTEL. HE THOUGHT THE WORDKING SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES SHOULD OFFER THE SOVIETS A LARGER FLEXIBILITY OFFER THAN WILL BE APPLIED TO US FORCES. HE REGARDED SUCH A PROPOSAL AS POLITICAL AND NOT WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF THE WG. UK REP (GERAHTY) SUGGESTED THAT SINCE IT IS LIKELY THE SOVIETS WOULD ASK FOR UNEQUAL FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES, THE

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WG SHOULD PROVIDE AT LEAST AN APPRECIATION OF THE UPPER LIMITS OF A SOVIET ALLOWANCE THATMIGHT BE MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE TO NATO.

3. UK REP PROPOSED THAT PARA 11 BELOW BE INCLUDED IN WG STUDY, TO POINT OUT TO SPC THAT FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR US/USSR FORCES FOLLOWING PHASE I OR FOR NON-US ALLIES/NSWP FORCES FOR PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES WILL INEVITABLY AFFECT THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF A COLLECTIVE "NON-INCREASE" COMMITMENT BETWEEN PHASES.

4. UK REP, SUPPORTED BY VANADIAN, BELGIAN AND US REPS, PROPOSED THAT WG STUDY END WITH A "FINDINGS" PARA SETTING FORTH WG CONCLUSIONS.

5. ACTION REQUEST: REQUEST DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR NEXT WG MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18.

6. BEGIN TEXT OF WG STUDY:

1. IN THEIR MEETING OF 27 OCTOBER THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE INVITED(1) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO CONSIDER FROM THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL POINTS OF VIEW, WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT, THE ALLIANCE MIGHT REQUIRE FLEXIBILITY FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE CASES OF:

A. THE GROUND FORCE SUB-CEILINGS IMPOSED ON US AND USSR FORCES AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS; AND

FOOTNOTE:

1. SPC(OT)R/27, 30 OCT 75

B. THE LIMITATIONS ON AGGREGATE ALLIED AND WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER RESPECTIVELY ARISING FROM "NO INCREASE" COMMITMENTS BETWEEN PHASES.

THE WORKING GROUP SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EFFECTS OF APPLING SUCH ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY, RECIPROCALLY, TO THE WARSAW PACT.

2. THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS QUOTED ABOVE, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE POST-PHASE II SITUATION.

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3. IN A PREVIOUS REPORT(2) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP STUDIED, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER, THE DESIRABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF ARRANGING CEILINGS OR SUB-CEILINGS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALLOW SOME LIMITED FREEDOM FOR NATO, POST-MBFR, TO TRANSFER MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND THUS RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE THEIR FORCES. IN ESSENCE THE WORKING GROUP FOUND THAT, OVERALL, THERE COULD BE ADVANTAGE FOR NATO TO NEGOTIATE A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE POST-PHASE II (FREEDOM TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES) IN THE ORDER OF 20,000 MEN. THIS NUMBER SHOULD MEET POSSIBLE NATO

FLEXIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS:
AND RECIPROCAL APPLICATION BY THE WP WOULD BE MILITARYLY
TOLERABLE.

FOOTNOTE:

(2) AC/276-D(75)7, 8 SEP 75

US AND USSR POST PHASE I REDUCTIONS

4. THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR (1) PROVIDES
(IN PARA 36) THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE OF MBFR THE OVERALL
COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING SHOULD BE RESPECTED BY EACH SIDE WITH
NO NATIONAL SUB-CEILING OTHER THAN ON THE US AND SOVIET GROUND
FORCES WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING. THE ALLIANCE APPROACH(1) ALSO
REQUIRES THE NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I OF US AND USSR
GROUND FORCES ONLY. CEILINGS ON US AND USSR GROUND PERSONNEL
IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WHETHER OR NOT EXPRESSED NUMERICALLY,
WOULD BE APPLIED FOLLOWING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

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5. THE WORKING GROUP'S PREVIOUS STUDIES DID NOT ADDRESS
THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PHASE I A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR
US/USSR FORCES, TO BECOME EFFECTIVE AFTER REDUCTIONS AGREED IN THAT
PHASE. THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE INDICATED THAT, POST-PHASE I
REDUCTION, THEY WOULD FAVOUR AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED LIMITED
FREEDOM TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL BETWEEN US GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN

THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD GIVE THE US FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE MINOR VARIATIONS IN SERVICE MANNING TO ADJUST TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEW EQUIPMENT, DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS OR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTE:

(1) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

6. IN GENERAL TERMS, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT THE ADVANTAGES OF A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE, CITED IN THEIR PREVIOUS REPORT (1), WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO A LIMITED FREEDOM FOR US AND USSR TO TRANSFER MEN BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES POST-PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

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IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR US FORCES SHOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE.

7. THE US HAS PROPOSED A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE SUCH AS 5,000, FOR THE US FORCES POST-PHASE IN THIS ALLOWANCE SHOULD BE A PART OF THE OVERALL COLLECTIVE TOTAL OF 20,000 FOR EACH SIDE WHICH, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE(1), COULD POSSIBLY MEET CURRENT AND FUTURE ALLIED RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, ENSURE THAT THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WAS MAINTAINED.

8. ALLIED PROPOSALS TO NEGOTIATE A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR US FORCES (AND THEREFORE FOR USSR FORCES) ON THIS SCALE WOULD NOT, EITHER BY ITS FORM OR ITS SCALE, ERODE THE IMPACT OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSAL, PROVIDED THAT THE REDUCTIONS TO BE MADE BY THE US AND USSR WERE NOT ONLY AGREED BUT ALSO IMPLEMENTED BEFORE THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE BECAME EFFECTIVE. FURTHERMORE, ANY INCREASE OF US/USSR GROUND MANPOWER UNDER THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE COULD ONLY BE AT THE EXPENSE OF US/USSR AIR MANPOWER.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) AC/276-D(75)7, 8 SEPT 75

9. ANY USSR ALLOWANCES SHOULD BE CONTAINED WITHIN AN OVERALL COLLECTIVE TOTAL(1) OF 20,000 FOR ALL WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS THE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE RELEVANT:

A. THE USSR IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MUCH OF A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE BETWEEN PHASE I AND COMPLETION OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS. UNDER THE ALLIANCE APPROACH LEADING TO A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES, TRANSFERS OF USSR MANPOWER FROM AIR TO GROUND WOULD EXPOSE THE PACT AND PROBABLY THE USSR TO HIGHER GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

B. IF THE USSR WERE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ALLOWANCE TO INCREASE GROUND PERSONNEL, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE EXPENSE OF A

LIKE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

10. WITH REGARD TO THE SCALE OF FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR USSR,
THE NUMBER PROPOSED FOR THE US (SUCH AS 5,000) WOULD BE MILITARILY

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ACCEPTABLE. IT IS RECOGNISED, AS A HYPOTHESIS, THAT APPLICATION OF
THE FLEXIBILITY PRINCIPLE ON A BASIS PROPORTIONATE TO THE RATION OF
US/USSR FORCES (APPROXIMATELY 1/2) COULD GIVE THE USSR A NUMERICAL
FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE TWICE THAT OF THE US AND AMOUNTING TO 50
PCT. OF THE OVERALL COLLECTIVE WP TOTAL (20,000). AS THE USSR FORCES
IN THE AREA REPRESENT ABOUT HALF OF THE TOTAL WP FORCES,
PARTIONING OF THE WP FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE ON THIS BASIS
CAN BE ENVISAGED IN THE LONGER TERM. IF APPLIED IMMEDIATELY POST-
PHASE I REDUCTIONS, THE USSR WOULD THUS BE ENABLED TO INCREASE
GROUND FORCES, THROUGH RESTRUCTURING, TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN
THE US AND, POSSIBLY, BY 10,000. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH SOVIET
ACTION ARE DISCUSSED IN PARAS 9A. AND B.

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11. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR "NON-INCREASE/ COMMITMENTS. A
FLEXIBILITY ALLIANCE FOR US/USSR FORCES ONLY, NEGOTIATED IN PHASE
I, COULD AFFECT THE ALLIED CONCEPT(1) FO A COLLECTIVE "NON-

INCREASE" COMMITMENT FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS BETWEEN PHASES AND FOR A COLLECTIVE NON-INCREASE COMMITMEN
T
FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER AS A COMPLEMENT TO THE GROUND MANPOWER
COMMITMENT. AS SHOWN FOR THE PACT IN THE ILLUSTRATIVE TABLE
BELOW, IMPLEMENTATION OF US/USSR FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES WOULD
ENTAIL, FOR BOTH NATO AND THE PACT, EXCEEDING THE AGGREGATE
TOTALS IMPLICIT IN NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS FOR GROUND OR AIR
FORCES. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE TECHNICALLY

FOOTNOTE:

(1) C-M(74)83

POSSIBLE TO APPLY THE US/USSR FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE, AT
ANY AGREED SCALE, EQUALLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY, TO ANY CEILING

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IMPOSED BY A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT.

SERIAL SITUATION WARSAW PACT USSR ONLY

GROUND AIR GROUND AIR

A. IMPLICIT CEILING POST

PHASE I REDUCTIONS	869,000	208,000	411,000	65,000
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B. EFFECT OF APPLICATION

OF ALLOWANCE TO TRANS-

FER 5,000 SOVIET	874,000	203,000	416,000	60,000
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AIRMEN TO GROUND

FORCES BETWEEN PHASES

C. EFFECT OF APPLICATION

OF ALLOWANCE TO TRANS-

FER 5,000 SOVIET	864,000	213,000	406,000	70,000
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SOLDIERS TO AIR FORCES

BETWEEN PHASES.

LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM "NO-INCREASE" COMMITMENTS

12. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED, AS REQUESTED,
WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THE ALLIANCE MIGHT REQUIRE FLEXIBILITY
FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES BETWEEN PHASES I AND II
OF MBFR, IN THE EVENT THAT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS ON AGGREGATE
ALLIED AND WARSAW PACT STRENGTH ARISING FROM "NON-INCREASE"
COMMITMENTS BETWEEN PHASES.

13. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED (1) THE
REQUIREMENT AND APPROPRIATE SCALE OF A SIMILAR AGGREGATE FLEXIB-
ILITY ALLOWANCE, TO BE APPLIED POST-PHASE II, WHEN REDUCTIONS AGREED
IN BOTH PHASE I AND PHASE II HAD TAKEN PLACE. IN PRINCIPLE,

THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED IN THAT CONTEXT COULD APPLY EQUALLY TO CIRCUMSTANCES, POST-PHASE I, IN WHICH EXPLICIT NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS WERE APPLIED TO AGGREGATE NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES SEPARATELY.

14. IN SHORT, IN THOSE CONDITIONS OF LIMITATIONS OF ALLIED MANPOWER, IF THE PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES WERE TO BE OF SUBST-

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ANTIAL DURATION, IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO ESTABLISH AND RETAIN THE FREEDOM TO MAKE LIMITED TRANSFERS OF MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER, TO MEET POSSIBLE (NOT PROGRAMMED) RESTRUCTURING.

FOOTNOTE:

(1) AC/276-D(75)7

AC/276-D(75)5

15. IF A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE WERE TO BE APPLIED BETWEEN PHASES TO ALL ALLIED FORCES, THE SCALE OF THE ALLOWANCE SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE SAME BASIS AS THAT DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUP'S PREVIOUS REPORT (AC/276-D(75)7), I.E. IT SHOULD BE OF THE ORDER OF 20,000 MEN TO PERMIT POSSIBLE RESTRUCTURING: BUT IF IMPLEMENTED IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES THIS FIGURE (20,000) SHOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE INCREASED TO PRODUCE AN ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE FOLLOWING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

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16. WITHIN THAT 20,000, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR BOTH SIDES TO ALLOT A SPECIFIED ALLOWANCE TO THE US AND USSR SINCE, LACKING SUCH SPECIFICITY, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USSR TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE WHOLE OF THE ALLOWANCE TO REINSTATE USSR GROUND MANPOWER UP TO 20,000 BY TRANSFER OF USSR OR NON-USSR AIRMEN. THE SCALE OF FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES APPROPRIATE TO US AND USSR IS DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THIS PAPER.

17. HOWEVER, FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES FOR THE WHOLE OF THE ALLIED GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE ORDER OF 20,000 MEN PROPOSED IN PHASE I IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDUCTIONS OF US AND USSR FORCES ONLY, COULD SERIOUSLY ERODE THE ALLIED CONCEPT FOR PHASE I REDUCTIONS. IN THEORY, THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE WOULD ALLOW THE ALLIES AND THE PACT TO REPLACE 20,000 OF THEIR GROUND MANPOWER WITHDRAWN (29,000 US AND 68,000 SOVIET RESPECTIVELY) ALBEIT AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR MANPOWER.

18. HOWEVER, UNDER THE ALLIED APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS,
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REQUIRING PHASED REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING (ABOUT 700,000) FOR GROUND FORCES, INCREASES IN GROUND FORCES BETWEEN PHASES WOULD RESULT IN GREATER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II TO REACH THE PRESCRIBED COMMON CEILING. ALSO THIS FREEDOM IN PRACTICE WOULD BE CONSTRAINED FOR BOTH SIDES, BY THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THEIR AIR FORCES AT A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO MEET COMMITMENTS.

19. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, FROM A MILITARY/TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE IS A BALANCE BETWEEN THE ADVANTAGES (PARA 14) IN NEGOTIATING AN AGGREGATE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE AND THE DISADVANTAGES OF ALLOWING THE SAME AGGREGATE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE TO THE PACT (PARA 17).

20. THE WORKING GROUP FIND THAT:

A. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE LIMITED FREEDOM FOR THE US TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL BETWEEN RESIDUAL US GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS POST US REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I, TO PROVIDE FOR POSSIBLE RESTRUCTURING. THE US REQUIREMENT, WITHIN THE SCALE INDICATED (SUCH AS 5,000) WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE MILITARILY TO THE ALLIANCE. PARAS 6, 8

B. A RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE USSR WOULD BE MILITARILY TOLERABLE. PARA 7

C. ANY US/USSR FLEXIBILITY FREEDOM TO TRANSFER SHOULD BE CONTAINED WITHIN COLLECTIVE TOTALS OF 20,000 EACH, FOR ALLIED AND FOR WP FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. PARA 7

D. IF NEGOTIATED IN PHASE I FOR US/USSR FORCES ONLY, THE
FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIED
OFFER OF NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS, BETWEEN PHASES, ON GROUND
AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER. PARA II

E. TECHNICALLY, THE US/USSR ALLOWANCES COULD BE ENSURED
EITHER THROUGH AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THESE FORCES ONLY OR BY MEANS
OF AGGREGATE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES WITHIN WHICH SPECIFIC
ALLOWANCES WERE MADE FOR US/USSR. THERE ARE NO STRONG
MILITARY/TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A FIRM PREFER-
ENCE FOR EITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVES.END TEXT OF WG STUDY
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